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ABSTRACT
Most aid spending by governments seeking to rebuild social and political order is based on an opportunity-cost
theory of distracting potential recruits. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely
to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence
in locations with active insurgencies. We test that prediction in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines,
using survey data on unemployment and two newly-available measures of insurgency: (1) attacks against
government and allied forces; and (2) violence that kills civilians. Contrary to the opportunity-cost
theory, the data emphatically reject a positive correlation between unemployment and attacks against
government and allied forces (p<.05%). There is no significant relationship between unemployment
and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians. We identify several potential explanations, introducing
the notion of insurgent precision to adjudicate between the possibilities that predation on the one hand,
and security measures and information costs on the other, account for the negative correlation between
unemployment and violence in these three conflicts.
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1. Introduction  
The vast majority of aid money spent to reduce political violence is motivated by an 
opportunity-cost theory of distracting recruits. Two causal logics underlie this theory 
(United States Army 2006). The most commonly cited is that gainfully employed young 
men are less likely to participate in insurgent violence
1. A slightly less prominent 
argument is that unemployment creates grievances, generating support for insurgent 
violence (Brainard and Chollet 2007, 3). This support could lead to more violence 
directly—through more recruits or enhanced fundraising—or indirectly—by reducing the 
willingness of a population to share information with counter insurgents. Whichever 
causal pathway is posited, the testable implication is the same: a positive correlation 
between unemployment and insurgent violence.  
 
The opportunity-cost approach is generally based upon a number of often implicit 
assumptions about the production of insurgent violence. Some of these include: 
-  Participation in insurgency is a full-time occupation, in the sense that individuals 
cannot be legitimately employed and active insurgents at the same time. 
-  Insurgency is a low-skill occupation so that creating jobs for the marginal 
unemployed reduces the pool of potential recruits. 
-  The supply of labor is a binding constraint on insurgent organizations. 
Each of these assumptions is questionable in some contexts, suggesting first that 
empirical testing is warranted, and second, that the relationship between unemployment 
and insurgency may be more complex than is commonly assumed. 
 
Other causal channels predict a negative correlation between unemployment and 
violence. Suppose, for example, that the main constraint on the production of violence is 
the extent to which non-combatants share information about insurgents with the 
government (Kalyvas, 2006; Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2008). If counterinsurgents 
spend money to buy intelligence—as they routinely do—then as the local employment 
                                                 
1 General Chiarelli, the U.S. Army Commander of Multinational Forces in Iraq, made this 
argument in a press briefing, December 8, 2006.   3 
picture worsens and household incomes drop, the marginal dollar spent to buy 
information will go further and violence will fall. Alternatively, suppose that security 
efforts—establishing checkpoints and the like—reduce violence but also increase 
unemployment by impeding the movement of goods and services (Hendawi 2008). That 
would imply a negative correlation between unemployment and violence. Or, fighting a 
perceived occupying force might be something people do out of belief in the cause, but 
can do only once their basic needs are satisfied. If insurgency is a normal ― good‖ in this 
narrow sense, then an improved economic situation could lead to greater levels of 
participation and hence greater violence so that reduced unemployment causes more 
violence.  
 
We investigate the relationship between unemployment and political violence using 
panel data on local unemployment and insurgent violence in three countries: Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and the Philippines.
2 These countries vary greatly both in geography and in the 
nature and intensity of the insurgencies they face. Yet they yield broadly similar results. 
 
The data rule out a positive correlation between unemployment and violence for all 
three countries: if there is an opportunity cost effect, it is not dominant in any of them. 
Using micro-data from three countries provides plenty of inferential leverage. Assuming 
that the internal relationships between violence and unemployment within these countries 
are independent—a reasonable assumption given their geographic spread and the 
different time periods observed in each—then combining our results across countries 
allows us to reject the null hypothesis of a positive correlation at the 99.95% confidence 
level. 
 
Why is the correlation of unemployment and violence generally negative? Existing 
data do not allow us to fully adjudicate between possible reasons, but we offer evidence 
that it is due to the relationship between local economic conditions and 
                                                 
2 Our data are based labor force surveys and three newly-available datasets that include 
two sub-national measures of insurgency: (1) attacks against government and allied 
forces; and (2) violence that kills civilians.   4 
counterinsurgents‘ efforts to combat violence. Our findings are consistent with two 
hypotheses concerning counterinsurgency: (1) as local economic conditions deteriorate, 
government forces and their allies are able to buy more intelligence on insurgents (i.e., 
the price of information falls); and (2) actions taken to enhance security—establishing 
checkpoints, building walls, and the like—damage the economy. 
 
The remainder of this paper describes our effort to study the relationship between 
unemployment and insurgent violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. First, we 
briefly review the existing literature. We then lay out a theoretical framework –including 
some alternatives, describe our data, report estimation results, and conclude. 
 
2. Literature Survey  
Three major theoretical arguments link unemployment and violence at the local level. 
The first is the opportunity-cost approach which first surfaces in Becker‘s theory of crime 
(Becker, 1968). Grossman (1991) applies it to rebels‘ time-allocation, predicting that as 
opportunities for potential rebels to work in legitimate occupations improve, the amount 
of time they will provide to insurgency declines.  
 
The opportunity-cost approach is incorporated in Fearon‘s (2008) model that 
predicts insurgent violence will increase in income inequality as relatively poor rebels see 
more to gain from expropriating resources from the relatively rich.  This model links 
opportunity costs to a second theoretical mechanism—appropriation, or rent capture—the 
idea that the greater the economic gains associated with controlling an area, the greater 
the effort rebels will invest in violent capture. Dube and Vargas (2008), for example, 
report evidence that violence increases in oil-rich areas of rural Colombia when the price 
of oil increases. Similarly, Hidalgo et al (2010) provide empirical evidence that economic 
shocks drive the rural poor in Brazil to invade large landholdings and that this effect is 
especially pronounced in areas of high land inequality and in areas with fixed-rent 
tenurial arrangements, which do not provide peasants insurance against income shocks. 
Blattman and Miguel (2009) provide a general survey. 
   5 
  A third major theoretical argument is the hearts-and-minds approach, which states 
that the key predictor of violence is the attitude of the population towards the 
government. That attitude in turn predicts whether insurgents can survive to conduct 
attacks against a militarily superior foe. This strain of thinking has been most prominent 
among practitioners of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Mao Tse-Tung famously 
argued the people are ― the sea in which rebels must swim‖ (Mao, 1937). 
Counterinsurgency theorists from the post-Colonial wars relied on similar arguments 
about the criticality of the population‘s attitudes
3, as did the Iraq/Afghanistan cohort of 
Western counterinsurgents.
4 Importantly, this literature stresses that it is not the ability to 
recruit combatants that constrains insurgents, but rather the ability to induce non-
combatants to withhold information from counterinsurgents. Akerloff and Yellen (1994) 
present an analytical statement of this approach, arguing that excessive punishment will 
fail to deter urban street gangs if the community responds by withholding information 
police need to catch gang members. Evidence from captured internal documents of Al 
Qaeda in Iraq indicates analogous orders to avoid killing noncombatants (Combating 
Terrorism Center, 2006).
5 A Taliban code of conduct released in the summer of 2009 
contains explicit directives to ―br ing the hearts of civilian Muslims closer to them….‖ 
and to avoid civilian casualties.
6 Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2008) apply ― hearts and 
minds‖ logic to analyze the response of violence to reconstruction and social service 
                                                 
3 This view is largely based on the British experience in Malaya, the French in Algeria 
and the U.S. in Vietnam. It is explained in Triquier (1961), Taber (1965), Galula (1964), 
Clutterbuck (1966), Thompson (1966), Kitson (1971), and Popkin (1979).  
4 Articles by practitioners in this vein include Sepp (2005), Petraeus (2006), Cassidy 
(2006), and McMaster (2008). This is distinct from Berman and Laitin (2008), and 
Berman (2009), who argue certain rebel clubs do not share information with 
noncombatants, and are thus unaffected by actions of noncombatants. Economic 
development and improved governance still play a role in countering these clubs, though, 
as their social-service providing organizational bases are vulnerable to competition. 
5 ― Stop the killing of people unless they are spying, military, or police officers. If we 
continue using the same method, people will start fighting us in the streets.‖ From, 
― Instructions to Abu-Usamah‖ from the collection ― Captured Zarqawi Network Letters 
from Iraq‖ posted April 20 2006, www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony.asp , accessed 
June 5 2010. 
6 Al Jazeera (2009), 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/07/200972775236982270.html, accessed June 
5 2010.   6 
provision programs in Iraq, testing the logic that these programs cause noncombatants to 
favor the government side, inducing them to share information with counterinsurgents.  
 
  Evidence generally supports opportunity-cost theory at the sub-national level with 
respect to crime. Studies show that in the United States crime rates increase as wages in 
the legal economy fall and as unemployment rises (Grogger, 1998; Gould et al 2002; 
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001). A similar pattern has been observed with respect to 
insurgency in rural Columbia where increases in prices of agricultural commodities 
predict reduced insurgent violence (Dube and Vargas, 2008) and with respect to uprisings 
in Brazil where economic shocks drive land invasions by the rural poor (Hidalgo et al, 
2010). These findings are consistent with cross-country evidence that low GDP/capita 
predicts civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003); that correlation 
holds even when using rainfall to identify exogenous variation in GDP/capita (Miguel et 
al, 2004). A notable exception is Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010), who—consistent 
with our results for Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines below—find that 
unemployment and the incidence of suicide attacks in Palestine are negatively correlated, 
even after including fixed effects and a rich set of covariates. 
 
Little formal quantitative research has been reported which tests opportunity cost 
theory in the context of political violence, or that tests hearts-and-minds theory, though 
the literature cited above is rife with supportive anecdotal evidence. This is unfortunate, 
as determining which mechanism is dominant—hearts and minds or opportunity costs—
is critical to properly designing economic aid programs in efforts to rebuild social and 
political order. 
   7 
3. Theoretical Framework 
The opportunity cost approach is a theory of rebel recruitment and retention along the 
lines of Becker‘s (1968) theory of crime. Imagine a potential insurgent choosing between 
work at wage w, and insurgency. Many factors might influence the decision of those 
individuals, including commitment to a cause, risk aversion, attitudes towards violence, 
etc., all of which would influence the threshold market wage, w*, above which they 
would prefer work to insurgency. Let F(w*) be the cumulative distribution of threshold 
wages across both potential and current insurgents, and let N be the number of such 
individuals. For simplicity assume a single wage rate, w, in the economy. Then N(1-
F(w)) is the number of insurgents, a decreasing function of wages in the legitimate 
economy. Assuming that variation in unemployment is due to variation in labor demand, 
a negative correlation between wage rates and unemployment rates would yield a positive 
correlation between unemployment and the number of insurgents.  
 
In this fairly general version of the opportunity cost theory, insurgents are drawn 
not only from among the unemployed, but also from among individuals in low wage 
employment or who are out of the labor force. One could easily generalize to a model in 
which insurgency is a not a full time job by adding an intensive (hours) margin, in which 
insurgent hours would also increase with market wages, and decrease with 
unemployment. Even among individuals who are currently out of the labor force the 
expectation of a high wage in some future employment, which would be precluded by 
being caught engaging in insurgency would yield the same insurgency-reducing effect of 
high wages. Overall, these complementary mechanisms all yield the same overall 
prediction of a positive correlation of unemployment and the number of insurgents. 
 
We do not directly observe the size of the insurgent force, only the amount of 
violence. Does a larger insurgent force imply more violence? For very small insurgent 
forces that must be true, but the relationship could turn out to be non-monotonic. If an 
insurgency became strong enough in numbers, it may reach a point at which more 
insurgents may induce the government (and/or its allies) to stop contesting the space, 
yielding less violence and much less measured violence (as measurement generally   8 
requires some degree of presence, with the notable exception of raids and air strikes).
7  
For a full analysis of the extent to which space is contested in a ― Hearts and Minds‖ 
counterinsurgency, see Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2008). They show that under fairly 
general conditions optimal effort by counterinsurgents increases monotonically with 
insurgent strength until the extreme case of uncontested regions is reached. Of the three 
conflicts we examine, the Afghan case is the only one in which there was substantial 
uncontested space. We treat this in our empirical analysis by separately examining the 
Pashtun majority regions which contain the areas that went uncontested because of a 
combination of insurgent strength and low Afghan and NATO troop levels (Rhode and 
Sanger 2007).   
 
To summarize in terms of an estimating equation, across regions r=1...R, an 
opportunity cost theory predicts that the correlation between violence, v, and 
unemployment rates, u, will be positive, except if the region is uncontested, in which case 
the correlation should be zero (since the amount of violence is unrelated to the size of the 
insurgent force). 
 
(1)  vr  =    +   ur   +  r  .  
 
The first thing to note about this equation is that if violence increases 
unemployment by reducing access to markets or depressing investment, then an estimate 
of  will be biased upward, exaggerating the true opportunity cost effect. Alternatively, 
that coefficient could be biased in a negative direction—and in fact the estimated 
correlation between unemployment and violence could be negative—if rent capture, 
security measures, or information cost mechanisms are in play. While we do not observe 
those directly, it is useful to examine the implications for a regression involving 
observables. We examine those ideas in turn.  
 
                                                 
7 Kalyvas (2006) offers the strongest version of this argument. An alternative possibility 
is Fearon‘s (2008) suggestion that the insurgency could reach a size where additional 
members create more detection risk for the organization, leading to decreasing levels of 
realized violence.   9 
Rent capture, or predation, is the idea that violence is directed at the expropriation 
of economic rents, in the absence of some nonviolent means of dispute adjudication. 
Economic rents would then be an omitted variable with a positive coefficient in (1), 
plausibly having a negative correlation with unemployment—as economic activity is 
unemployment reducing. That would imply a negative bias on our estimated coefficient 
on unemployment, which, if rent capture dominated the opportunity costs mechanism, 
could make it negative. If insurgency were a normal good, the bias and testable 
implications would be the same as those of rent capture. 
 
Security measures provide a second avenue relating unemployment and violence. 
Successful security measures reduce violence by definition. At the same time, 
roadblocks, curfews, barriers, spot inspections and other efforts to control the movement 
of goods and people might reduce economic activity, even accounting for the 
countervailing increase in economic activity due to improved security of people and 
property. That was the case in the West Bank and Gaza in the 1990s, for example, where 
the benefits of security measures imposed through movement and access restrictions 
accrued mostly to Israelis, while the economic costs were borne by Palestinians, 
generating very high unemployment rates (Fischer et. al. 2001; Kanaan 1998). Kanaan 
emphasizes that even in a very agricultural economy, uncertainty about the duration of a 
trip to market can severely depress investment, causing economic damage. Security 
measures, especially the building of large blast walls, also had widely-discussed negative 
repercussions for the flow of goods, services, and people in Baghdad in 2007 (Crain 
2007). If security measures are positively correlated with unemployment then they imply 
a negative bias on an estimate of  in equation (1), which, if damage due to security 
measure dominates the opportunity cost mechanism, could make the estimate negative. 
 
Finally, information costs might decrease when unemployment rises, allowing for 
violence reduction through a separate security mechanism—the market for information, 
or tips. Counterinsurgents routinely use rewards to buy information on insurgents. The 
British government in Malaysia, for example, paid informants on a sliding pay scale 
based on the organizational role of the people killed or captured as a result of tips,   10 
informing on platoon commanders paid more than informing on rank-and-file soldiers 
and so on.
8 The U.S. Central Command REWARDS program, for example, was set up 
― to facilitate the capture of wanted persons or weapons‖ among other purposes (Multi-
National Corps Iraq 2009, D-3). High unemployment is a symptom of low income, and 
the lower is income, the more information counterinsurgents can purchase (either in cash 
or in kind) with a given budget.
9 In other words, high unemployment should indicate a 
low price per tip. If those tips allow reductions in violence, and low tip prices are 
negatively correlated with the unemployment rate, then the estimate of  in equation (1) 
would again be biased downward, and could be negative if this information cost 
mechanism dominates the opportunity cost effect.  
 
All three of these alternatives predict a negative bias in the relationship between 
unemployment and insurgent violence. Anticipating a consistently negative coefficient 
we need a way to distinguishing between explanations. Security and information 
mechanisms share the characteristic that unemployment proxies for factors that limit the 
operational effectiveness of insurgents. To measure that effectiveness we calculate 
insurgent precision, the proportion of attacks on coalition forces that kill no civilians.  
 
Here it is important to bear in mind that insurgents generally aim to avoid killing 
civilians. That is a direct implication of ― Hearts and Minds‖ theory, in which 
noncombatants control operationally crucial information. In the literature survey we 
                                                 
8 Formally the British paid insurgents to surrender with established payments by position. 
Informants who provided information that led to the capture or killing of insurgents 
earned 75% of those individuals‘ surrender values (Long 2006, 48 citing Komer 1972, 
72-74). 
9 For a colorful summary of US activity buying tips in Afghanistan and elsewhere, see 
Joby Warrick ― CIA buys Afghan chief‘s loyalty with Viagra,‖ in the Washington Post, 26 
December 2008. ― In their efforts to win over notoriously fickle warlords and chieftains, 
the officials say, the agency's operatives have used a variety of personal services. These 
include pocket knives and tools, medicine or surgeries for ailing family members, toys 
and school equipment, tooth extractions, travel visas and, occasionally, pharmaceutical 
enhancements for aging patriarchs with slumping libidos, the [U.S. intelligence] officials 
said.‖ 
   11 
provided a few examples from captured documents. One of those, the Taliban code of 
conduct (reportedly approved by the Mullah Omar) is quite explicit on this matter:  
"Governors, district chiefs and line commanders and every member of the 
Mujahideen must do their best to avoid civilian deaths, civilian injuries and 
damage to civilian property. Great care must be taken…. …Suicide attacks should 
only be used on high and important targets. A brave son of Islam should not be 
used for lower and useless targets. The utmost effort should be made to avoid 
civilian casualties."
10 
These clear admonitions against civilian casualties imply that our insurgent precision 
measure is a reasonable proxy for the ease with which insurgents can attack.  
 
Both the security effect and information cost mechanisms predict a negative relationship 
between unemployment and insurgent precision while the predation mechanism has no firm 
prediction. Both security and information effects should be strongest in more densely populated 
areas where the risk of killing civilians in any attack is greater, and hence the negative 
correlation between unemployment and insurgent precision should be strongest in densely 
populated areas.  
 
In terms of an estimating equation, we have  
 
(2)  pr,t  =  µ  +  π ur,t  +  dr,t  +   ur,tdr,t   +  νr,t  , 
 
where p is insurgent precision, d is population density, ud is the interaction of unemployment 
and population density, with the subscripts indexing by region and time. The shared predictions 
of both the security measures mechanism and the information cost mechanism are that: precision 
and unemployment (proxying for improved security and/or low information costs) will be 
negatively correlated in the simple regression, equation (1); and the coefficient  will be negative 
in equation (2), as high unemployment (again, as a proxy) reduces precision more in regions with 
                                                 
10 Al Jazeera (2009), 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/07/200972775236982270.html, accessed June 
5 2010.   12 
dense populations.  Unfortunately we are unable to distinguishing between the security and 
information mechanisms using the data we have in hand, and must leave that investigation to 
future work. 
   13 
4. Data 
We study the relationship between unemployment and violence at the local level in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. In all three countries countries we collected 
observations of these variables for the smallest geographical units for which reliable 
population and unemployment data were available, the district (n=398) in Afghanistan, 
the district (n=104) in Iraq, and the province (n=76) in the Philippines.
11 
 
Our key dependent variable is the intensity of insurgent activity measured as the 
rate of attacks per capita against government forces and their allies. We generate these 
measures by aggregating incident-level data and focus on the rate of incidents because 
tightly geo-located data on Coalition and insurgent casualties are not publicly available 
for Iraq or Afghanistan. To maintain comparability of our estimates across countries we 
use incident rates as our primary dependent variable. 
   
For Iraq we use two data sources on violence. The first are data drawn from 
‗significant activity‘ (SIGACT) reports submitted by Coalition forces. These capture a 
wide variety of information about ―…e xecuted enemy attacks targeted against coalition, 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations‖ 
(Government Accounting Office, 2007; Department of Defense, 2008). Unclassified data 
drawn from the Multi-National Forces Iraq SIGACTS III Database provide the location 
(to approximately 100 meters), date, and time of attack for incidents between February 
2004 and July 2008.
12 We filtered these data to exclude violence not directed at Coalition 
and Iraqi government targets leaving a data set of 148,546 incidents spanning February 
2004 – December 2007. 
 
The unclassified information from the SIGACT data do not measure the 
consequences of attacks, so we supplement them with data from Iraq Body Count (IBC), 
                                                 
11 All data provided by the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) Project. 
12 The information provided in the unclassified SIGACT data are limited to the fact of 
and type of terrorist/ insurgent attacks (including improvised explosive devices [IEDs]) 
and the estimated date and location they occurred. 
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which uses press reporting to identify incidents that kill non-combatants. The IBC data 
capture 13,335 incidents in which civilians were killed (that can be accurately geo-
located). These incidents account for 49,391 civilian deaths. Each incident includes a 
reported target. We divide these killings into three categories, which will provide 
analytical leverage on the relationship between unemployment and violence:  
1.  Insurgent killings of civilians in the course of attacking Coalition or Iraqi 
government targets. 
2.  Coalition killings of civilians. 
3.  Sectarian killings, which includes all killing of civilians not falling in the 
other categories, capturing ethnic cleansing, reprisal killings, and the like. 
Insurgent precision is measured as the proportion of SIGACT attacks in a district/quarter 
that do not result in IBC insurgent-caused civilian casualties. That proportion averages 
92.3%, weighted by population. 
 
The analogues to SIGACTS incidents in Afghanistan are reported in two 
databases, the Joint Operations – INTEL Information System (JOIIS) and the Combined 
Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE); these differ because of different 
recording practices and definitions of incidents. JOIIS incidents reported are very broad, 
including counterinsurgency incidents, criminal events, economic events, enemy action, 
explosive hazards, friendly action, friendly fire, noncombatant events and ― suspicious‖ 
events. A subset of these, designated ― AGE‖, are enemy actions and explosive hazard 
events. CIDNE events include small arms fire, prematurely detonated explosives, mine 
strikes, mines found and/or cleared, IED (improvised explosive devices) found and/or 
cleared, IED explosions, IED hoaxes, suicide attacks, and indirect fire events. As in Iraq, 
incidents have time and location fields. We aggregate to district-months to match 
unemployment data in six separate months spread over 2008 and 2009.   
 
To generate data on insurgent attacks in the Philippines we coded unclassified 
details of over 22,245 individual internal security incidents reported by the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines from 1997-2006. These data were compiled from the original field 
reports of every operational incident reported during this period to the Armed Forces of   15 
the Philippines‘ Joint Operations Center by units conducting counterinsurgency and other 
internal security operations. Information coded from these reports include the date, 
location, and description of each incident, including the number of civilian casualties and 
who initiated the incident.
13 Each incident was assigned a unique location identification 
number that allows it to be plotted at the village level.  
 
The lack of fine-grained data on unemployment is the limiting factor in our 
analysis in all three countries. In Afghanistan we use five waves of the Afghan National 
Quarterly Assessment Report (ANQAR) household surveys, which we have from 
September 2008 through September 2009.
14 In Iraq three surveys capture unemployment 
at the district level: the Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS) which was fielded in 
March and April 2004, the 2005 World Food Program Food Security and Vulnerability 
Analysis in Iraq (June and July 2005), and the World Food Program Food Security and 
Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq (November and December 2007). In the Philippines we 
obtained provincial level unemployment rates based on the Republic of the Philippines 
Census Organization‘s quarterly Labor Force Survey (LFS) for 1997-2003 and 2006.
15 
 
To maximize the accuracy of our estimates we focus on periods when the data on 
unemployment are available. For Afghanistan we have between 363 and 365 (of the 398) 
Afghan districts for six separate months in 2008 and 2009. (The two dropped districts 
were lost because of unmatched district names.)  For Iraq we have 297 observations: 99 
districts over three quarters when surveys were in the field (Q1:04, Q2:05, Q4:07).
16 For 
                                                 
13 Data for other conflicts do not reliable count government-initiated incidents and so in 
our analysis we focus on insurgent-initiated incidents for the Philippines to maximize 
comparability. 
14 ANQAR survey waves were fielded as follows: Sept. 14-25, 2008; Dec. 23, 2008 – Jan 
2, 2009; Feb. 25 – March 9, 2009; June 4-13, 2009; Sept. 2009.  
15 The quarterly labor force surveys were aggregated to the provincial level by the 
Philippine Human Development Network to obtain reliable province-level estimates. 
Summary statistics are from their 2005 and 2008 reports and include figures for 1997-
2003 and 2006. Data available at http://hdn.org.ph/philippine-human-development-
reports/#hdrs.  
16  Five districts in Kurdish regions were not surveyed. These districts suffered little to no 
insurgent violence   16 
the Philippines this approach yields 546 observations: 78 provinces over seven years 
during which we observe both unemployment and violence (1997-1999, 2001 – 2003, 
and 2006). Table 1 provides population-weighted summary statistics for incident counts 
and other key variables. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
Several facts stand out from Table 1. First, the insurgency in Iraq is substantially 
more intense than that in Afghanistan or the Philippines. When measured in incidents per 
thousand the civilian casualty rate is an order of magnitude higher in Iraq than in the 
Philippines. Second, provinces in the Philippines are larger than districts in Iraq, and 
much larger than those in Afghanistan. This means our estimates for the latter two 
countries allow more precise matching of incidents to unemployment and other 
demographic variables that may predict violence. In Iraq our proxy for the proportion 
Sunni in a district is the vote share of political parties associated with the Sunni 
denomination at the governorate level, which averages 21%.
17 In the Philippines we 
measure 5.4% of the population as Muslim, concentrated in the southern islands. In 
Afghanistan we measure the percent Pashtun (averaging 38.5%), the proportion of males 
in a household (which may vary because of migration, and averages 52%) and household 
size (which averages 9.6 persons). 
 
 
5. Estimation  
We seek to estimate the relationship between violence and unemployment in the equation 
(1), reproduced here with time subscripts and with a region specific fixed effect,  
 
(1‘)  vr,t  =  r  +   ur,t  +  t  +  r,t  , 
 
                                                 
17 Using district-level ethnicity measures created by combining maps with remote-sensing 
data on population does not effect the results.   17 
where v measures the incidence of violence, u is the unemployment rate, r indicates 
region (districts in Iraq and Afghanistan, provinces in the Philippines), r  are region-
specific fixed effects, and t  are period effects. Bearing in mind that violence is likely to 
reduce employment (by discouraging investment, consumption and production) we will 
interpret our estimate of the best linear predictor, , as an underestimate of the causal 
effect of unemployment on violence.  
 
Table 2 reports regression analysis for Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. The 
dependent variable in all specifications is the number of attacks against government 
forces—a category that includes both Coalition and Iraqi government forces in the Iraqi 
SIGACTS data. The key independent variable is the unemployment rate in that 
district/quarter (Iraq and Afghanistan) or province/year (Philippines). In Table 2 we 
report linear regressions on the number of attacks per 1,000 population.  
 
We control for time-invariant region-specific characteristics in two ways. First, 
since both conflicts have an ethnic component we employ ethnicity controls: the Sunni 
vote-share in the December 2005 election for Iraq, the Muslim population share for the 
Philippines and the Pashtun population share for Afghanistan. Second, we employ region 
fixed-effects which control for all time-invariant region-specific factors (including 
ethnicity measures). In all regressions we use time fixed-effects to control for secular 
trends and seasonality affecting the entire country. We also re-run the analysis in regions 
where the relationship may differ across regions. In Iraq we focus on Baghdad (where 
population density may constrain rebels and coalition forces –as we discuss below). For 
the Philippines we focus on provinces with more than five percent Muslim population as 
much of the insurgent violence during the period we study is driven by the secessionist 
movement in Mindanao that is organized around religious grievances; the main insurgent 
group is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In Afghanistan we report results 
separately for majority Pashtun areas, where violence is concentrated. As a robustness 
check, we also report separate estimates in Afghanistan for three different measures of 
violent incidents.  
   18 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
  Our key finding is reported in Table 2: the estimated coefficient on 
unemployment is consistently negative in all three conflicts. Higher unemployment 
predicts less violence. This result remains true even after controlling for a wide range of 
possible confounding factors using time and space fixed effects. In Iraq we reject a 
positive coefficient in three of the four specifications at the 95% confidence level, and the 
fourth at a 90% confidence level, as reported in the upper panel. The results are stronger 
for the entire Philippines (second panel), where a positive correlation is rejected with 
99% confidence, and consistently negative but insignificant in the more Muslim 
provinces where the southern insurgency is concentrated. (A separate and ongoing, 
communist insurgency was concentrated in the northern Philippines during the sample 
period.) In Afghanistan (third panel) the coefficient is positive in the cross-sectional 
regression, which includes only the ethnicity controls, but omits other time invariant 
factors. The estimate is consistently negative and statistically significant once we control 
for all fixed effects, regardless of the measure of violence used. The p-values for a one 
tailed test for the AGE, JOIIS and CIDNE measures, using fixed effects, are all 0.08 (by 
coincidence).  
 
The statistical power of Table 2 lies not in the individual coefficient estimates but 
in their combination. Separated by time and space, each case yields additional 
information about the relationship between unemployment and insurgent violence. 
Interpreting exactly how that information should affect our beliefs requires being specific 
about the sampling scheme and correlation between countries. The three countries 
examined are a sample of opportunity, so they are not representative of the full 
population of countries experiencing insurgent violence. Nevertheless, our criterion for 
sampling was not the correlation of unemployment and violence, so that there is no 
particular bias incurred by conducting inference by combining information across these 
countries. (If there were, inference based on micro-data from any given country would be 
subject to the same critique.) Samples within countries are representative, so combining 
information across countries can be understood as testing a null hypothesis about the   19 
correlation of unemployment and insurgent violence in countries that were at risk of 
inclusion in our sample of opportunity.
18  
 
With parameter estimates from three separate conflicts, we can jointly test the 
hypothesis that the relationship between conflict and unemployment is nonzero i.e., H0 : 
afghanistan = philippines = iraq = 0, using a Wald test. Assuming our asymptotic inference is 
valid in the three individual cases, then, by the Cramer-Wold device, a vector of the three 
elements will converge in distribution to a multivariate normal distribution. Because the 
countries in our sample all had a U.S. occupation or heavy involvement, the probability 
that we reject the null may be correlated, so it makes sense to explicitly incorporate that 
correlation into a joint hypothesis test. Figure 1 uses that distribution to graph the p-value 
at which we reject the null that the relationship is nonnegative in all three conflicts 
against the correlation coefficient between the standard error estimates.
19 If the parameter 
estimates are perfectly uncorrelated, then each case truly constitutes an additional test. If 
estimates are perfectly correlated, the additional tests yield no additional information. 
The Figure illustrates that moving from zero correlation to the coefficient of correlation 
which maximizes the p-value (0.44) causes our p-value to increase from 0.0041 to 
0.0224.
20 However, we still reject the null in this two-tailed test with 95% confidence.  
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18 Those would be countries where sub-national panel data about both unemployment and 
rebel violence are available or could be constructed—the population that researchers can 
possibly use for statistical inference. To our knowledge this list includes Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Guatemala, India, Iraq, Israel, Nepal, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Spain, and Vietnam. We thank an anonymous referee for emphasizing the 
need to clarify the sampling scheme. 
19 A convenient feature of multivariate normal distributions is that the covariance in the 
(i,j)th position of the variance-covariance matrix is equal to SE(i)SE(j) where SE(i) 
is the estimated standard parameter error for country i. 
20 The relationship between the degree of correlation between country coefficents and the 
p-value at which the null of joint zero is rejected can be non-monotonic. Please see  
Appendix 1 for a discussion.    20 
An alternative approach makes the statistical power that comes from combining 
estimates across countries more intuitive. If we assume complete independence of the t-
ratios across countries, we can treat them as three independent hypothesis tests. Because 
the probability of three independent events occurring—in this case, falsely rejecting the 
null in each of the three countries—is just a product of the probability that the individual 
events occur, we can multiply probabilities to form a joint test. If we start with the prior 
that unemployment and violence are positively correlated in all three countries, i.e., H0 :  
> 0, then, based on the fixed effects estimates for the entire countries in the second 
column from the right, top three panels, the three joint one-tailed tests would be rejected 
at a significance level of (1- .1 * .01 * .1 =) 99.99%
21. Alternatively, if the prior were that 
the relationship is nonnegative, i.e., H0 :  = 0, then the three joint two-tailed tests would 
reject the null at (1- .2 * .01 * .2 =) 99.96%, again based on the second column from the 
right, top three panels
22.  Even if we assume the p-value maximizing degree of correlation 
in country parameter estimates above, we still reject the null with 97.8% confidence. The 
likelihood of falsely rejecting the null of a nonnegative relationship between 
unemployment and violence, when these results are combined across countries, is very 
small. 
 
  An alternative estimation approach when using count data is to assume a 
functional form and estimate using maximum likelihood methods. Supplemental Table 
S1 takes that approach, assuming a negative binomial probability distribution for the data 
generating process–a generalization of a Poisson process that allows for arbitrary 
variance. The advantage of this approach is a gain in both precision and consistency, if 
the assumed functional form is correct. The disadvantages are inconsistency if the 
distribution is not negative binomial and no latitude to allow for serial correlation in the 
error terms–running the risk of overstating precision. In practice, Table S1 reports 
qualitatively similar results. In the fixed effects specification, which is preferred because 
                                                 
21 The actual product of p-values from a one-tailed test is 0.0000069.   
22 Note rejection at 99.96% confidence implies a p-value with zero correlation of 0.04, 
which is greater than the 0.0156 we found assuming zero correlation in the Wald test.  
This is principally because our p-values in the individual country t-tests are not perfectly 
equal to .1, .01, and .1 cutoffs.   21 
it allows for the greatest control over unobserved district-specific contributors to 
violence, the correlation of unemployment and violence is negative in all the national 
samples. The basic finding is robust to non-linear specifications. 
 
  Recall that while the prediction of the opportunity cost model on the link between 
wages and the number of insurgents was unambiguously negative in the discussion 
above, the link to violence was muted by the possibility of uncontested spaces, allowing 
the possibility that increased unemployment (by reducing wages) may have no effect on 
violence. That is of particular interest in Afghanistan over the sample period, where the 
violence is concentrated in Pashtun majority regions which also contain a large number 
of areas that go uncontested by the governments for long periods of time. To ensure that 
our results are not driven by lack of contestation in some areas with high unemployment 
Supplemental Table S2 reports estimates including an interaction term for Pashtun 
majority districts. The negative correlation of unemployment and violence is in fact 
concentrated in these regions, providing strong evidence that the results for Afghanistan 
are not spurious. The coefficients on the interaction term are strongly negative. In a 
regression using only Pashtun regions (bottom panel of Table 2) we reject the positive 
null at statistical levels of .05. (In the remaining Pashtun minority regions the fixed 
effects estimates are two statistical zeros and one small positive coefficient (for the 
CIDNE incident measure the coefficient is 0.0033 and the t ratio is 1.60). Those estimates 
are consistent with the idea that any positive correlation between unemployment and 
violence is being muted in the Pashtun majority regions by a weak correlation between 
insurgent strength and violence, but that idea cannot explain the negative coefficient 
estimates. Some other mechanism must be in play to explain these results.
23 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the mild negative correlation in Afghanistan between changes in AGE 
incidents and changes in unemployment, conditional on covariates. A regression line reproduces 
the coefficient in the second column of results of the third panel of Table 2, with slope -0.049. 
The size of the circle for each district is proportional to population. It is clear from the figure that 
                                                 
23 Appendix Table S2 reports on further robustness checks for the Afghan regressions 
reported in Table 2.   22 
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These negative coefficients are particularly striking when we consider that they are 
probably biased upwards by a reverse-causal relationship in which violence increases 
unemployment through the damage it does to the economy. They are also large, at least in Iraq, 
indicating that a 10% increase in unemployment from the mean level (from 10% to 11%) is 
associated with 0.74 less attacks per 1000 per district-quarter for the entire country, about three 
times the sample mean. In Baghdad the associated decrease is over twice that large, at 1.96 less 
attacks. While we can‘t learn too much statistically from three waves of nine districts in 
Baghdad, it does illustrate the pattern we see throughout Iraq.
25  
 
These results do not imply that policies which increase employment rates cause 
violence, since the variation in unemployment rates that‘s negatively correlated with 
violence is not necessarily due to exogenous changes in labor demand. For instance, it 
may instead be due to enhanced intrusive security efforts that reduce both employment 
and violence. Yet this negative correlation must lead us to doubt whether job creation 
policies actually decrease violence. What they certainly suggest is that the relationship 
between employment and violence is perhaps more complex than has been commonly 
                                                 
24 Figure 2 also provides additional evidence against the relationship being a spurious 
result of trying to fit a linear model when the true relationship is one where violence is 
decreasing at high levels of unemployment because areas under insurgent control go 
uncontested. If that were the case, we would see outliers clustered below the regression 
line at high and low levels of unemployment. 
25 Appendix figure 1 plots the data for Baghdad to illustrate the fixed effects regression in 
the rightmost column, with changes in incidents plotted against changes in 
unemployment rates in both 2004-05 and 2005-07. The very small district of Tarmia is 
omitted from the Figure as it is an outlier and forces rescaling of the graph. It is included 
in the regression analysis in Table 2. It has no substantial effect on the results. The figure 
shows our Iraq results are not driven by any particular outlier, but rather by the pattern 
that played out in some of Baghdad‘s largest districts: violence fell while unemployment 
rose in Sadr City, Al-Resafa and Adhamiya in 2004-05, but subsequently rose while 
unemployment fell in the same three districts in 2005-07.   23 
assumed. To probe possible explanations for this pattern we now turn to a closer 
examination of the Iraqi insurgency where the negative correlation between 
unemployment and violence is strongest. 
 
The ‘Surge’ and the ‘Anbar Awakening’ 
The first obvious concern with the results from Iraq in Table 2 is that they may be driven 
by factors not controlled for by region and year fixed effects. Suppose, for example, that 
the ― surge‖ in Baghdad (which began in January 2007) reduced violence but also 
strangled the local economy as military units built walls around specific neighborhoods 
and established checkpoints through the city. We would then observe a negative 
correlation between unemployment and violence not because unemployment increases 
violence but because the surge increased the former while reducing the latter. 
Alternatively, we might have spurious effects because of the politically driven reduction 
in violence in Sunni areas between August 2006 and December 2007, due to the ‗Anbar 
awakening‘, though it is not clear why these would be associated with increased 
unemployment. To explore these possibilities we re-ran the basic fixed-effect regressions 
for Iraq but separated the sample by period and region. Table 3 reports these results. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
As the Table shows, we can again reject the null hypothesis of a positive 
correlation between unemployment and violence at the 90% confidence level for the full 
three years observed. In Baghdad the data strongly reject a positive correlation in both 
2004-05 and over the entire sample period. The negative correlation becomes 
substantially weaker in Baghdad during the 2005-07 interval that spans both the pre-
― surge,‖ and ― surge‖ periods, allowing us to rule out the possibility that our results reflect 
either: (1) the building of walls and placement of additional troops in Baghdad in 2007 
which caused both high unemployment and low violence; or (2) the major changes in 
patterns of violence from mid-2006 on in Baghdad.  The data do not allow us to rule out a 
spurious effect associated with the Anbar awakening, as data from one province provide   24 
insufficient precision, yet it is unclear why that process –which reduced violence, would 
be associated with increased unemployment. 
 
Replication 
Are these results somehow particular to officially collected incident data? The top panel 
of Table 4 replicates the results in Table 3 using the Iraq Body Count data. These are 
included here in an effort to expose our core results to the possibility of refutation, using 
a second Iraqi dataset, this one based on press reports rather than on administrative data. 
The Table reports the results of a regression of incidents in which civilians were killed on 
unemployment rates, whether those incidents were insurgent, sectarian or coalition-
induced. (Coalition-induced civilian casualty incidents are relevant because they often 
occur when coalition forces are unexpectedly faced with a strong insurgent threat, 
inducing the use of imprecise methods such as air strikes to extract themselves safely.) 
The results are not very informative, as they are not statistically significant –regardless of 
perpetrator; but they certainly do not show a positive correlation of unemployment and 
violence. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
  The lower panel of Table 4 repeats the exercise using as an outcome measure the 
number of civilian casualties rather than the number of incidents involving civilian 
casualties. Here a positive correlation appears for Insurgent-perpetrated casualties, 
though only in Baghdad. This exception in Baghdad may appear to be supportive 
evidence for an opportunity cost theory, but it is more likely evidence of a tactical failure 
by insurgents. Recall that these are incidents in which insurgents targeted coalition forces 
but killed civilians. We know from internal insurgent documents that many groups regard 
collateral damage—as distinct from intentionally targeting civilians—as politically 
problematic (Fishman and Moghadam, 2008), a fact we will use in the next section to 
help distinguish possible mechanisms for our results. 
   25 
Why does unemployment correlate with less violence? 
The negative correlation between unemployment and violence directed at government forces is 
inconsistent with opportunity costs being the dominant mechanism in play. Yet what is the first 
order connection between labor markets and violence? The result is consistent with at least three 
theories: (1) predation – insurgent violence rises in economically advantaged periods and areas 
because those areas become more valuable; (2) security effects – government security efforts 
simultaneously suppress both economic activity and insurgent violence; and (3) information – 
counterinsurgents can operate more effectively in areas with high unemployment because the 
cost of information is lower.  
 
Following the logic of Section 3, we attempt to distinguish between these possibilities 
using data from Iraq and the Philippines, where data on civilian casualties are available. The 
logic is that if high unemployment proxies for either security measures or low costs of 
information, low insurgent precision will be predicted by: (1) unemployment; and (b) the 
interaction of unemployment and population density. Predation has no prediction in this 
regression. Recall that our insurgent precision variable is calculated as the proportion of attacks 
on coalition forces that kill no civilians. In Iraq this is calculated as the difference between 
SIGACT and IBC incidents directed at Coalition and Iraqi forces, divided by SIGACT incidents. 
In the Philippines civilian casualties are reported directly in the incident data. 
 
Our estimating equation is then,  
 
(2‘)  pr,t  =  µr  +  π ur,t  +  dr,t  +   ur,tdr,t  +  t  +  νrt  , 
 
where p is insurgent precision, d is population density, u is measured as before (and we‘ve 
included a full set of indicators for periods). Security effect and information cost theories predict 
that the coefficient on unemployment, π, will be negative in a short regression (equation (1)), and 
that the coefficient on the interaction, , will be negative in this long regression. As before, we 
don‘t think of these estimated coefficients as causal effects, but, assuming that any reverse 
causality between precision and unemployment is second order, we are confident in interpreting 
the coefficients as tests of the theory.     26 
 
Table 5 reports the results of this analysis. Beginning with the upper panel, on 
Iraq, three facts stand out. First, high unemployment is weakly associated with low 
insurgent precision in all sample periods, though not significantly so. Second, if we 
include population density and an interaction term in the regression, we find that 
insurgent precision is lower in densely populated areas during both sub-periods.
26 This 
makes sense, as civilians are unfortunately more likely to be affected by shrapnel, over-
pressure, and stray small arms fire in densely-populated areas. Third, and most 
importantly, once we control for this density effect we find a strong negative coefficient 
on the interaction term between unemployment and population density, indicating that in 
the dense urban districts of Iraq unemployment was associated with reduced precision in 
both sub-periods (columns four and six) and over the entire sample period (column two). 
This last result is consistent with both the security effects and information costs 
explanations for the negative correlation.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
  The results from the Philippines are quite similar. Unemployment predicts 
significantly less violence in the pooled regression and in second sample period, 2001-3 
and 2006 (column 5). The coefficient in the first sample period is positive but not 
statistically significant. When the interaction of unemployment and violence is inserted 
the coefficient on that term is negative and highly significant in the second period 
(column 6), as predicted by both security effects and information cost theories. The same 
is true in the regression that pools both periods (column 2). 
 
Taken as a whole these results are consistent with the conjecture that insurgents 
switch tactics when unemployment is high, restricting themselves to methods that reveal 
less information but allow less precise targeting of coalition forces (e.g., sensor-activated 
                                                 
26 Note also that population density is sufficiently time-varying in Iraq during the war to 
allowing coefficients to be precisely estimated in a fixed-effects regression. This reflects 
tragically high rates of internal displacement and refugee migration.   27 
IEDs vs. command-detonated ones) and thus inadvertently kill more civilians. What we 
cannot determine from these data is whether that tactical switch is due to 1) increased 
security pressure, such as checkpoints, barriers, and patrols – that raise unemployment by 
restricting the movement of goods and services; or 2) improved information flows to 
coalition forces about insurgent activities, as the price of leaks declines when 
unemployment rises. These results are neutral with respect to the predation hypothesis.
27 
Recalling a grievance-based mechanism that motivated our original discussion, it‘s worth 
noting that Table 5 provides additional evidence refuting the idea that it is a dominant 
force; assuming that unhappy or unemployed noncombatants are less likely to share tips 
with the government—just as they are thought to be less likely to join the insurgency—
one would expect insurgent precision to be high in areas with high unemployment. Table 
5 shows the opposite. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our findings on the relationship between unemployment and insurgency in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
the Philippines call into question the opportunity cost theory that dominates thinking in policy 
circles. These results suggest that any opportunity cost effects—at least in these three cases—are 
overshadowed by other forces. Combining data from three insurgencies allows us to 
emphatically reject a positive correlation between unemployment and violence. 
 
Why is higher unemployment associated with less violence? While we cannot say for 
certain, a closer look at the data from Iraq and the Philippines suggests that the pattern stems 
from the relationship between local economic conditions and counter-insurgents‘ efforts to 
combat violence, not from the labor market for insurgents. The data are consistent with two 
possibilities. The first is that as local economic conditions deteriorate, the price of information 
falls and government forces and their allies can buy more intelligence on insurgents, 
undermining insurgent operations. The second is simply that the techniques used to enhance 
                                                 
27 The insurgent precision results are also neutral with respect to the additional possibility 
that increased violence induces migration disproportionately among working-aged adults, 
which in turn reduces the unemployment rate, generating a negative correlation. We think 
that this is unlikely, especially in low-mobility rural communities, but cannot rule out the 
possibility with these data.     28 
security – establishing checkpoints, building barriers and conducting raids – inhibit commerce 
and damage the economy. Distinguishing between those alternatives, and establishing the 
importance of predation, is a task for future research. What we can say with confidence is that 
while it may still be true that increasing unemployment causes greater political violence on the 
margins, that effect is swamped by other mechanisms. Greater unemployment in these three 
conflicts predicts less political violence, not more. 
 
Our research presents two serious policy implications for academics, donor countries, and 
aid organizations. First, the negative correlation of unemployment with violence indicates that 
aid and development efforts that seek to enhance political stability through short-term job 
creation programs may well be misguided. Instead, development funds are likely to buy more 
‗no-bang for the buck‘ when directed at small-scale projects that improve the quality of local 
government services, thereby inducing noncombatants to share intelligence about insurgents with 
their government and its allies. We find evidence for just such an effect in related research on the 
impact of U.S. reconstruction spending in Iraq (Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2008). 
 
Second, much more basic research is required to guide development aid spent in efforts 
to rebuild social and political order. These programs are not methodically evaluated the way 
comparable domestic programs would be. This is a tragedy. Aid resources are scarce and the 
needs massive. A better understanding of how, when, and where aid spending helps reduce 
political violence will both further our understanding of insurgencies, while helping to guide 
practitioners in applying limited development aid in conflict and post-conflict societies. 
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TABLES FOR TEXT INSERTION   
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Population, Unemployment, and Violence 
      Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
  Population (district)  605,340  464,106  10,966  1,624,058 
  Unemployment (rate)  .117  .063  0  0 .495 
  Sunni vote share (governorate)  .207  .250  0  .917 
  Population density (1,000/km
2)  1.53       3.13  .000286  13.62 
           
  SIGACT incidents / 1000              .258     .504  0  8.54 
           
Iraq  Iraq Body Count (IBC) incidents / 1000       
(district/quarter)     Insurgent  .005  .011  0  .240 
     Sectarian     .013  .026  0  .340 
N=312     Coalition  .002  .006  0  .140 
           
  IBC civilian casualties / 1000         
     Insurgent  .018  .043  0  .611 
     Sectarian                     .046  .159  0  1.70 
     Coalition    .015  .102  0  1.32 
           
  Insurgent precision   .923  .159  0  1 
           
  Population (province)  1,002,281  1,271,405  15,095  11,321,875 
  Unemployment (rate)  .105  .039  0  .201 
  Percent Muslim   .053  .181  0  .993 
           
Philippines  Rebel initiated incidents / 1000  .010  .024  0  .213 
(province/year)  All non-criminal incidents / 1000  .034  .070  0  1.13 
           
N=624  Civilian casualties / 1000  .015  .042  0  .659 
           
  Insurgent precision   .816  .309  0  1 
           
  Population (district)  77,7804    1,410,510  2,462  4,017,898 
  Unemployment (rate)  .241  .206       0  1 
  Percent Pashtun  .385  .389        0  1 
Afghanistan  Percent males  .522  .094       0  1 
(district/month)  Average household size  9.56  1.73  5.84  21.1 
            
N=2,160  AGE incidents/ 1000  .049     .152            0  2.18 
  JOIIS incidents/ 1000  .083     .225            0  2.90 
  CIDNE incidents/ 1000  .046     .154            0  2.13 
Sources:  
- Unemployment and population: Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS) (March and April 2004), World 
Food  Program  Food  Security  and  Vulnerability  Analysis  in  Iraq  (June  and  July  2005;  November  and 
December 2007), Republic of the Philippines Census Organization, Labor Force Survey (LFS) for 1997 
through  2003  and  2006,  Afghan  National  Quarterly  Assessment  Report  (ANQAR)  surveys  wave  1 
(September 2008) through wave 5 (September 2009), LandScan
TM population.  
- Violence: Empirical Studies of Conflict Philippine project, internal security incidents, Armed Forces of 
the Philippines, 1975-2008; Multi-National Forces Iraq SIGACTS III Database; Joint Operations – INTEL 
Information System (JOIIS), Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE). Iraq Body Count. 
- Other: Sunni vote share in Iraq is based on the December 2005 elections. Muslim population share in the 
Philippines is from the 1995, 2000, and 2007 censuses. Pashtun population share, male population share, 
adult population without any formal schooling share, and average household size in Afghanistan are from 
ANQAR. 
All means are population weighted   34 
Table 2: Unemployment and Violent Incidents in Iraq, the Philippines, and Afghanistan 
    Linear Regression 








  Region  All  Baghdad  All  Baghdad 
           
  Unemployment  -1.118**  -4.254***  -0.709*  -1.847*** 
Iraq    (0.542)  (1.460)  (0.552)  (0.566) 
(district/quarter)           
  Observations  312  27  312  27 
  R-squared  0.23  0.35  0.06  0.16 
           
  Controls  Ethnicity  Ethnicity  District FE  District FE 
           








  Region  All  Muslim > 5%  All  Muslim > 5% 
           
  Unemployment  -0.131***  -0.148  -0.152***  -0.113 
Philippines    (0.031)  (0.174)  (0.049)  (0.132) 
(province/year)           
  Observations  624  96  624  96 
  R-squared  0.33  0.35  0.141  0.354 
           
  Controls  Ethnicity  Ethnicity  Province FE  Province FE 
           
  DV  AGE/1000  AGE/1000  JOIIS/1000  CIDNE/1000 
           
  Unemployment  0.032**  -0.049  -0.063*  -0.049 
Afghanistan    (0.018)  (0.035)  (0.044)  (0.035) 
(district/month)           
  Observations  2,160  2,160  2,160  2,160 
  R-squared  0.17  0.08  0.105  0.075 
           
  Controls  Ethnicity  District FE  District FE  District FE 
           
  DV  AGE/1000  AGE/1000  JOIIS/1000  CIDNE/1000 
           
… of which  Unemployment  0.092**  -0.158**  -0.191*  -0.163* 
Afghanistan 
majority Pashtun    (0.054)  (0.085)  (0.106)  (0.088) 
           
  Observations  923  917  917  917 
  R-squared  0.10  0.22  0.25  0.21 
           
  Controls  Ethnicity  District FE  District FE  District FE 
Note: All regressions include time/wave fixed effects and are weighted by population. The Afghanistan 
sample has five waves of ANQAR data and all waves span two months, except wave 5 spanning one month 
(results are similar using wave-month fixed effects). Robust standard errors clustered by district/province 
reported in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1, all for one-tailed test with H0 : > 0. Variables 
described in note to Table 1. Iraq has 104 districts, the Philippines have 78 provinces, and Afghanistan has 
363 districts included in the samples above.   35 
 Table 3: Unemployment and Violent Incidents in Iraq, by period 
 
Dependent variable: SIGACT incidents 
  2004-07  2004-05  2005-07 
  All  Baghdad  All  Baghdad  All  Baghdad 
             
Unemployment  -0.709*  -1.847***  -0.581  -2.431***  -1.321  -1.696** 
  (0.552)  (0.566)  (0.514)  (0.933)  (1.060)  (0.905) 
             
Observations
  312  27  208  18  208  18 
R
2  0.062  0.162  0.068  0.164  0.040  0.135 
Note: Includes year and district fixed effects and are weighted by population. Robust 
standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1, all 





Table 4: Unemployment and Violence - Iraqi Civilian Casualties Incidents, by Perpetrator 
Note: Iraq Body Count data. Includes year and district fixed effects and weighted by population. 
Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1, all 
for one-tailed test with H0 : > 0. Variables described in note to Table 1. 
Perpetrator of 
Incident: 
Insurgent  Sectarian  Coalition 
Dependent Variable: Civilian Casualty Incidents 
  All  Not 
Baghdad 
Baghdad  All  Not 
Baghdad 
Baghdad  All  Not 
Baghdad 
Baghdad 
                   
Unemployment  0.013  0.016  0.011  0.009  0.011  -0.023  0.003  0.005  -0.010 
  (.011)  (.013)  (.010)  (.031)  (.039)  (.020)  (.008)  (.010)  (.010) 
                   
Observations
  312  285  27  312  285  27  312  285  27 
R
2  0.085  0.067  0.380  0.179  0.183  0.665  0.011  0.015  0.134 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Civilian Casualties 
  All  Not 
Baghdad 
Baghdad  All  Not 
Baghdad 
Baghdad  All  Not 
Baghdad 
Baghdad 
                   
Unemployment   0.037  -0.022  0.292***  -0.449  -0.003  -2.096  0.013  0.104  0.004 
  (0.047)  (0.038)  (0.054)  (0.430)  (0.111)  (1.731)  (0.046)  (0.099)  (0.061) 
Observations  312  285  27  312  285  27  312  285  27 
R
2  0.03  0.004  0.53  0.06  0.06  0.24  0.02  0.03  0.03   36 
Table 5: Insurgent precision, unemployment, and population density 
Dependent variable: Insurgent Precision = 1 – (Insurgent-killings/SIGACTs) 
 















             
Unemployment  -0.541  0.230  -0.556  0.202  -0.733  0.281 
  (0.493)  (0.179)  (0.683)  (0.133)  (0.658)  (0.330) 
             
Population Density    -0.243***    -0.345***    -0.302*** 
    (0.053)    (0.108)    (0.051) 
Unemployment *  
Pop. Density 
  -0.616***    -0.597***    -0.717*** 
  (0.041)    (0.041)    (0.054) 
             
Observations
  312  312  208  208  208  208 
R
2  0.087  0.460  0.054  0.680  0.158  0.623 
Joint F-Test on unemployment  
and interaction term 
  237.90***    219.38***    277.39*** 
     






























             
Unemployment  -1.196  -0.582  0.050  1.828  -3.475**  -1.848 
  (1.064)  (1.075)  (2.130)  (2.163)  (1.784)  (1.878) 
             
Population Density    0.143***    -1.941**    0.350** 
    (0.051)    (0.87)    (0.19)   
Unemployment *  
Pop. Density 
  -0.646***    0.425    -2.288*** 
  (0.13)    (0.59)    (0.68) 
             
Observations  624  624  312  312  312  312 
R
2  0.26  0.28  0.41  0.46  0.07  0.19 
Joint F-Test on unemployment 
and interaction term 
  25.99***    1.21    17.91*** 
Note: Includes year and district/province fixed effects and weighted by population. 
Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05,  
* p < .1, two-tailed. Precision set to 1 if no attacks and no civilian casualties, 0 if no 
attacks and civilian casualties. Other variables described in notes to table 1. 
 




Notes: ― Rho‖ is the first multiplying parameter in the (i,j)th off-diagonal term of the 
variation covariance matrix (SE(i)SE(j)) for the asymptotic joint distribution of the 
three individual country parameter estimates. The figure assumes that the pairwise 
correlation  is the same across the three country pairs. The p-value of the joint test 
declines as  increases above .45, because rejection in the high-t country (the Philippines) 
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Note: Variables on axes are residuals from table 2, panel 3, column 2 regression that includes fixed effects 
and regressors (― X‖): percent Pashtun, percent male, percent with no schooling, and average household 
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Supplemental Tables and Figures 
 
Appendix Table S1: Unemployment and Violent Incidents in Iraq and the Philippines, 
Negative Binomial Regression 
    Negative Binomial Regression 













         
Unemployment  -5.313***  -13.66***  -2.718**  -6.672*** 
  (1.371)   (2.093)  (1.172)  (2.115) 
         
Observations  312  27  279  27 
         






















Muslim > 5% 
         
Unemployment  -8.199***  -7.161*  -1.156  1.816 
  (2.012)  (4.654)  (2.026)  (3.981) 
         
Observations  624  96  552  96 
         























Pashtun  >   
50% 
         
Unemployment  -0.424***  0.501**    -0.106  -0.164* 
  (0.176)  (0.237)  (0.103)  (0.119) 
         
Observations  2160  923  1697  854 
         










Note: All regressions include time effects. The coefficient on population is fixed to unity, 
in order to control for scale (using the Stata ― exposure‖ option). Sample sizes vary as 
regions with no incidents during the entire sample period are excluded. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1, one-tailed with H0 : > 0. Variables 
described in note to Table 1. 
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Supplemental Table S2: Unemployment and Violent Incidents in Afghanistan with Extra Controls       
                       
Dependent Variable  AGE/1000  AGE/1000  JOISS/1000  CIDNE/1000  AGE/1000  JOISS/1000  CIDNE/1000 
                       
Unemployment  -0.049*  -0.050*  -0.066*  -0.051*  0.004  -0.004  0.006 
   (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.044)  (0.036)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
% Pashtun     0.010  0.027*  0.011  0.047*  0.069*  0.049* 
      (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.030)  (0.039)  (0.031) 
% Pashtun x Unemp.              -0.148*  -0.170*  -0.155* 
               (0.094)  (0.118)  (0.096) 
% Male     0.118**  0.188**  0.099**  0.127**  0.199**  0.108** 
      (0.039)  (0.076)  (0.035)  (0.042)  (0.078)  (0.038) 
% No Schooling     0.004  -0.003  0.004  0.005  -0.002  0.005 
      (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.010) 
Avg. Household Size     -0.003  -0.008**  -0.004  -0.004*  -0.008**  -0.004* 
      (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
                       
District FE  -  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2,146  2,146  2,146  2,146  2,146  2,146  2,146 
R-squared  0.081  0.092  0.123  0.083  0.108  0.133  0.101 
                       
Note: All regressions include ANQAR wave fixed effects and are weighted by population. Robust standard errors clustered by district reported in 
parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1, one-tailed test with H0 : > 0. Variables described in note to Table 1. Afghanistan has 363 districts included in 
the samples above.  
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28 9 districts x 3 years = 18 observations of differences. 
28 
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Appendix 1: Testing Joint Hypotheses About the Same Relationship  
With Potentially Correlated Coefficients 
 
This note is designed to clarify Figure 1 in “Do Working Men Rebel”, which illustrates how 
the  p-value  (probability  of  rejecting  when  true)  is  related  to  a  cross-sample  correlation 
between estimated values of a given coefficient. The following is relevant only in the case 
where  we  are  jointly  testing  hypotheses  about  the  same  relationship  (i.e.,  comparable  t-
statistics) using different datasets.  
 
There are two factors to consider in testing a joint hypothesis about the same relationship 
when coefficients may be correlated: 
1.  The higher the degree of correlation, the less information is provided by additional 
tests of the same hypothesis using additional datasets.  
2.  The higher the degree of correlation, the more relevant a t-statistic in one dataset is 
to our inference in another dataset. 
 
The second factor is most relevant if our various datasets generate different t-statistics. 
To illustrate, in Figure 1 the t-statistic is equal to 1.96 in three hypothetical datasets. The y-
axis depicts the p-value of a joint test that the null hypothesis is true in all three populations, 
using a Chi-squared test, and the x-axis depicts the coefficient of correlation between the 
three  tests.  Because  the  t-statistics  are    identical,  consideration  1  dominates.  That  is, 
increasing the correlation between the coefficients (and therefore the t-statistics), means that 
the additional tests yield less information. In the limit the additional tests yield no additional 
information, and we reject the null at 5% confidence just as we would if there were only one 
dataset.   
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However, if we have different t-statistics in our different datasets, then a strong rejection in 
one dataset has spillovers for inference in the others. With a high degree of correlation, then, 
strong rejection in some dataset in the presence of  weak rejection in others can combine to 
strenghten our confidence in rejecting the joint null hypothesis. To demonstrate, Figure 2 
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To reinforce this point, I have also simulated a joint test with a t-ratio of 1.96 in one dataset 
and 1 in two others. Here we see that strong rejection begins to dominate at a lower degree 
of correlation. 
 
 
 